Based on input from a wide range of experts and a review of other literature (including existing standards for voting systems and accessibility), we identified principles for remote ballot marking systems with strong consensus.

We identified 9 principles for remote ballot marking systems

The principles are a high level view of the requirements for remote ballot marking systems. For each principle, general guidelines provide further detail about what a remote ballot marking system must do, or the voters must be able to do using it, to meet the principle.

• Principle 1: Trusted and transparent
• Principle 2: Consistent with other voting options
• Principle 3: Access for all voters
• Principle 4: Minimizes privacy and security risks
• Principle 5: Supports accurate and secret ballot marking
• Principle 6: Enables easy review, printing, and packing of the ballot
• Principle 7: Supports election administration procedures
• Principle 8: Tested for usability for all voters
• Principle 9: Robust and reliable

Principles can help identify systems that are accessible and support strong election integrity

Strong principles and guidelines that provide clear direction for designing and deploying a remote ballot marking system can help election officials choose (or develop) systems that meet the needs of election integrity as well as making it easier for everyone to vote.

We were pleased to discover that there was little conflict between the goals of accessibility and  election integrity. Not only can the requirements for these goals co-exist, but in many cases they support each other.

Remote ballot marking systems are a rich area for research

There is a growing number of systems that enable elections offices to provide voters with remote ballot marking tools. Many were originally designed for UOCAVA voters under the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act, but voters with disabilities and many other voters want to use them.

They are similar in function to ballot marking devices covered by the VVSG, but there is little guidance or research specifically about them.

There are advantages for all voters in using a ballot marking system for usability and accuracy.

There are different views on about how to create these tools in a way that supports best practices in election integrity coupled with ease of use.

As part of the work to develop these recommendations, we convened a meeting of stakeholders, developers, and advocates to explore benefits, barriers, and requirements for remote ballot marking systems to:

• Create a journey map showing the steps or activities in using a remote ballot marking system.
• Identify and then explore possible solutions for removing risks and barriers from the systems.
• Explore high level principles for remote ballot marking systems.

Some of the big design questions we considered:

• What are the risks or benefits of different ways of obtaining the ballot to mark?
• What are the risks and benefits of different options for when and how voters authenticate themselves to the system by signing in or confirming personal identification?
• What are the risks and benefits of different printed ballot formats?
• How can the system and communications about remote ballot marking be designed to help voters understand the process, and risks or benefits to different aspects of the voting experience?
• How can the system and communications be designed to encourage and facilitate voter verification of the printed ballot by everyone, including people with visual disabilities

Meeting notes from the meeting (PDF) (PPT version)

Terminology (working terms and definitions)

Background reading for the workshop included literature in accessibility, privacy, security, and trust in online or remote voting systems. 

Security and risk analysis 

• Security Best Practices for the Electronic Transmission of Election Materials to UOCAVA Voters, NISTIR 7711 by Regensheid and Beier, September 2011
• A Threat Analysis on UOCAVA Voting Systems, NIST IR 7551 by Regensheid and Hastings, December 2008

Accessibility, usability, and trust

• Accessibility and Usability Considerations for UOCAVA Remote Electronic Voting Systems, Working paper for TGDC/NIST, January 14, 2011
• The Relationship Between Trust and Usability in Systems, Claudia Z. Acemyan and Phillip Kortum in Proceedings of the HFES, 2012
• Usability Test Report on Maryland Online Ballot Marking Tool, Kathryn Summers, and others at University of Baltimore for the State Board of Elections, January 2014

Reports on the accessibility of other election systems

• Access Denied: Barriers to online voter registration for citizens with disabilities, ACLU and the Center for Accessible Technology, February 2015
• City of Toronto Internet Voting Project: Web Accessibility (WCAG 2.0) Evaluations of Voter-Facing Demonstration Sites, Jan Richards, Inclusive Design Research Centre (IDRC) at OCAD University for the City of Toronto, January 2014

Internet voting

• Final report by Utah’s iVote Advisory Committee (2015)
• The Future of Voting: End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting, US Vote Foundation (The executive summary has a good description of security requirements, although this project was specifically focused on internet voting)

This work was performed by the Center for Civic Design in collaboration with NIST under a contract from the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology.